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Gender Diversity, Corporate Governance and Financial Risk Disclosure in the UK 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial risk 
reporting in the UK. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a panel data of 50 non-financial firms belonging to 
ten industrial sectors listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 2011-2015. Multivariate regression 
techniques are used to examine the relationships. Additionally, to alleviate the concern of potential 
endogeneity, we use two-stage least squares and fixed effect estimators. 
Findings – The findings of this study reveal that corporate governance has a significant influence on 
financial risk disclosure. Specifically, we find that block ownership and board gender diversity have a 
positive effect on the level of corporate financial risk disclosure. While, there is no significant relationship 
between board size and corporate financial risk disclosure. 
Originality/value – This study adds to the emerging body of literature on corporate governance–risk 
disclosure relationship in UK context using content analysis. The study also highlights that gender diversity 
enhances financial risk disclosure. 
 
Keywords: Financial risk disclosure, block ownership, gender diversity, board size, corporate 
governance. 






Over the past two decades, the concept and practice of corporate governance has gradually 
become the central focus for academics, managers and policymakers (Abor & Fiador, 2013; 
Elmagrhia et al., 2018; Katarachia et al., 2018; Fatima et al., 2018; Nyombi, 2018; Stuebs & 
Sun, 2015; Srivastava et al., 2018). This can be attributed to the increasing concerns over the 
rising incidences of corporate fraud as well as fraudulent financial disclosure leading to 
corporate scandals and the collapse of major firms (Gerged et al., 2018; Luo, 2016). This 
significant attention given to corporate governance structures and principles in firms indicates 
that it has a major influence on both policies and strategies and, therefore, the eventual financial 
performance of these corporations. Without doubt, corporate governance mechanisms in the 
UK have become stronger in recent years, which can be largely attributed to the development 
of corporate governance codes from as early as 1992 through to today (Cheffins, 2015). This 
journey began with the introduction of the Cadbury Code in 1992, which focused on the 
separation of corporate ownership and control as well as the composition of a corporate board 
and the set-up of an internal control system (Cheffins, 2015). The Cadbury Code was followed 
by the Greenbury report in 1995, whose contribution largely focused on the remuneration of 
corporate directors. The Greenbury report was followed by the Hampel report in 1998, which 
concentrated on the management of risk in corporate organisations (Elshandidy & Neri, 2014). 
Of particular interest in the UK’s corporate governance scene is financial disclosure and 
accountability. The Cadbury Committee was established in 1991, mainly because of continuing 
concerns regarding the standards of financial disclosure as well as accountability due to an 
earlier generation of corporate scandals such as the BCCI, Maxwell, and Polly Peck (Elzahar 
& Hussainey, 2012). In 2003, the Higgs report was subsequently introduced, designed to 
provide guidance to corporate organisations with regard to the important role of external 
directors as well as the audit committee. Recent economic changes, as well as the emergence 
of high profile financial and economic failures over the past decade, have reminded 
management boards, heads of corporate organisations and regulators of the need for efficient 
corporate governance and financial risk disclosure (FRD) approaches (Luo, 2016). In the UK, 
these financial and economic troubles have addressed the need to understand and fine-tune the 
relationship between corporate governance, risk management and corporate FRD, which a 
number of research studies have sought to investigate (Alnabsha et al., 2018; Elamer & 
Benyazid, 2018; Elamer et al., 2017). The case of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, a UK-
based insurance firm, which failed to provide its investors with the proper financial risk reports 
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leading to the loss of millions of pounds of investors’ money, demonstrates the critical 
importance of risk management and in particular FRD within the UK corporate environment 
(Cheffins, 2015).  
There is a need to unearth how corporate governance mechanisms influence FRD in the 
UK corporate context. Previous studies have only attempted to focus on the agency theory as 
well as the corporate board monitoring role as a context of just concentrating on corporate 
governance (Luo, 2016). However, this study proposes to employ a multi-theoretical 
framework, where the study looks into essential and relevant theories, such as agency, 
shareholder, stakeholder. Also, the majority of the past studies on corporate governance and 
FRD were conducted in the period prior to the year 2010, which means there can be a research 
gap in the period after the recovery of the UK’s economy. During the period between 2010 and 
2016, numerous events, as well as changes, have taken place with regard to corporate 
governance, not just at country level but also at global level, which influences matters within 
the UK’s corporate sector. It is well known that the presence of a smart governance system 
within corporate organisations can provide the relevant strategy designed to help such 
corporations in overcoming economic as well as financial challenges, such as the case of the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis (Trinh et al., 2015). Therefore, the period after the global 
financial crisis proves to be essential with regard to conducting this study in order to further 
examine the nature and influence of corporate governance mechanisms in the UK’s corporate 
sector.  
Therefore, this study contributes to the current research by measuring the level of FRD 
and the determinants of risk disclosure and how corporate governance mechanisms may 
enhance FRD in developed countries such as the UK in recent years after the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The following section reviews 
corporate governance reforms and financial risk reporting challenges within the UK context. 
The next sections discuss the theoretical framework for financial risk reporting, review the 
empirical literature on FRDs and corporate governance, outline the research design, report the 






2. Theoretical literature 
The motivation and variations in FRD, as well as the impact of CG on FRD, can generally 
be explained by a number of theories, including agency and stakeholder theories. These 
theories tend to place emphasis on different aspects of FRD and governance phenomena, as 
explained below, and to this extent, they are not mutually exclusive with each particular 
theoretical perspective being limited in its ability to fully explain the impact of CG on the level 
of FRD (Elamer et al., 2019; Ntim et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
First, agency theory can be used to explain FRD, especially when it comes to explaining 
information asymmetry and uncertainty between shareholders and management (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Better governance structures could enable investors 
to deal more effectively with risk diversification, portfolio investment decision-making and 
reducing investors' uncertainty by alleviating information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders via enhancing financial risk disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013). Second, from a stakeholder 
theory perspective, in the current complex business environment, firms may choose to 
ameliorate financial risk disclosure as differentiating characteristic; to send significant signals 
to the different stakeholders about firm performance. Also, boards of directors and stakeholders 
signal their performance quality through an increase in the level of financial risk disclosures, 
and thus, a decrease in the level of information asymmetry (Elamer et al., 2019; Ntim et al., 
2013). Therefore and given the inherent interdependencies or overlaps amongst the theories, 
this study argues that applying a framework that combines these theories will provide a richer 
basis for understanding and explaining the various motivations and variation of FRD within 
the UK context. 
2.1 Agency theory 
Corporate governance refers to the policies, processes, policies, customs and regulations 
which help in directing, controlling and administering a corporation (Baker & Anderson, 2010). 
Corporate governance codes tend to specify the rights and responsibilities of the different 
stakeholders in a company. It articulates the relationship between the corporate governance and 
the immediate stakeholders, who are basically the employers and the shareholders (Baker & 
Anderson, 2010). 
From the corporate governance perspective, the agency theory is supposed to help the 
company executives or the corporate board leadership structure to better understand the 
interests of the shareholders, hence, working in a manner that seeks to safeguard their interests 
(Filatotchev & Wright, 2010). FRD can be one way of safeguarding the interests of the 
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shareholders by the company executives. According to the agency theory, a large board can be 
good in monitoring the performance of the firm. Thus, a firm with a large board is more likely 
to disclose more and more information, thereby leading to voluntary disclosure (Allini et al., 
2015). In addition, the agency theory proposes that firms can improve their managerial 
monitoring as well as board independence by having a board that is diverse in terms of gender 
and ethnicity (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Moreover, corporate governance is seen as articulating the relationship that exists between 
the company and society; therefore, the concept of corporate governance is regarded as a core 
area of economic sociology. This is because the sociological study of corporate governance is 
largely concerned with the relationships that exist within the company but not just between the 
agents and the principals. It also focuses on the relationship between all of the stakeholders as 
well as in the mediation processes with the objective of attaining an effective organisation 
(Bainbridge, 2012). It is manageable to both improve the performance and decrease agency 
problems by using the lower levels of information asymmetry in such a manner where there is 
a concentrated ownership and increasing managerial monitoring (Greco, 2012; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013). 
2.2 Stakeholder theory 
This theory is related to organisational management as well as business ethics, which look 
at addressing the values and morals involved in managing the affairs of corporate governance 
(Norwani et al., 2011). Unlike the agency theory, the stakeholder theory places emphasis on 
the fact that external stakeholders that are deemed to be affected by the affairs of the company 
have a right to be consulted on specific issues. From a corporate governance perspective, the 
stakeholder theory of the management of a company should view the general public, suppliers 
and surrounding community as indirect beneficiaries or victims of their actions or decisions. 
The 2007/2008 global financial crisis demonstrated the failure to adhere to the stakeholder 
theory by corporate executives. In relation to risk disclosure, the importance of FRD or any 
other form of financial disclosure is supposed to link a firm’s management such as the CEO 
and the board of directors to shareholders as well as stakeholders (Ntim et al., 2013).  
Financial disclosure is often viewed as a bridge designed to communicate or connect a 
firm with what can be termed as the external parties (stakeholders). How effective such a 
communication is can be used as a measurement in determining the outcome or performance 
of the firm. It is essential to point to the fact that shareholders of a firm need to be considered 
as an important stakeholder group in a similar manner to the suppliers, the customers, members 
of the local community and employees (Phillips, 2011). Therefore, a business organisation 
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owes special duties to its investors as well as different responsibilities and obligations to 
various groups of stakeholders.  
One of the key challenges of the stakeholder theory revolves around what can be termed 
as the unified concept of stakeholders. According to Filatotchev & Wright (2010), one of the 
main questions asked is whom should the firm perform? In essence, the firm is placed in a very 
tight dilemma with regard to whose interests it can meet in order to be regarded as performing 
the legal obligations under corporate governance. This is because most of the stakeholder 
theorists have underestimated the influence of the shareholders in terms of advancing their 
interest. There is a need for stakeholder theorists to understand that when the needs of the 
shareholders are sufficiently met, it is much easier to advance the interests of the other 
stakeholder groups (Phillips, 2011; Mansell, 2013). The Enron scandal offers a good example 
of how the stakeholder theory can be undermined when the interests of the shareholders are not 
met by the management of the firm (Phillips, 2011). The board of directors of Enron conspired 
against the interest of the shareholders, thereby losing their confidence and leading to the 
eventual collapse of the company. Corporate risk disclosure plays a crucial role in advancing 
the stakeholder theory as it offers vital information to existing investors or shareholders as well 
as potential future investors who can be found in the other stakeholder groups. 
3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.1 Board gender diversity and FRD 
From the perspective of a corporate board, there are various features present among the 
different board members or directors, which can affect their decision-making especially with 
regard to FRD policies and practices (Shultz & Amacom, 2001; Dhir, 2015). These features 
range from the ones that can be directly observed such as ethnicity, age and gender as well as 
those features that are considered to be less visible, i.e., religion, education and occupation. A 
diverse board means that there is also mixed views on satisfactorily handling issues related to 
the interest of the firm (Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013). Western nations such as the UK can 
be credited with making significant strides when it comes to the inclusion of women in senior 
management and leadership positions such as the board of directors, which is contrary to the 
case in less developed countries (Dhir, 2015). Inclusivity is a valuable component of corporate 
governance because it provides a wider platform for participation and opinion sharing. 
Disclosure is largely viewed as a managerial duty but the presence of diverse opinion is 
expected to put sufficient pressure on the management to engage in more disclosure (Mishra 
& Jhunjhunwala, 2013). The general characteristic among company directors that may have a 
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significant influence on the company’s decisions constitutes board diversity (Ntim et al., 2013; 
Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). It is possible to obtain resources as well as connect a company 
to the outside environment when the ethnic and gender backgrounds of their boards are diverse 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Oliveira et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013).  Moreover, the agency 
theory proposes that firms can improve their managerial monitoring and board independence 
by having a board that is diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; 
Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013).  
Barako and Brown (2008) and Ntim et al. (2012a) also suggest that voluntary disclosures 
are positively influenced by board diversity; while Ntim and Soobaroyen (2012) observe that 
less diverse boards experience less CSR reporting compared to companies that have more 
diverse boards. Ntim et al. (2013, p.377) observe that “corporate boards that are made up of 
diverse ethnic and gender backgrounds tend to increase the probability of there being more 
voluntary disclosures”. This can indicate that female members disclose more information than 
male members on the board of directors in UK firms. This leads us to the third hypothesis will 
be as follows: 
H1 – there is a significant positive relationship between the female gender of a corporate 
board and the efficiency of corporate FRD. 
3.2 Block ownership and FRD  
Agency theory suggests that improved FRD may reduce agency problems through lower 
levels of information asymmetry, as well as increased managerial monitoring (Ntim et al., 
2013; Greco, 2012; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Previous research (Ntim et al., 2013; Beretta 
& Bozzolan, 2004; Oliveira et al., 2011) shows that dispersed ownership structures lead to 
more voluntary disclosure when compared to concentrated ownership. For instance, Ntim et al. 
(2014) show that block ownership is negatively associated with the level of FRD. However, 
Allini et al. (2015) argued that there is a positive association between block ownership and 
FRD. Therefore, this can imply that UK firms will engage in a high level of FRD, including 
voluntary disclosures (Oliveira et al., 2011; Abraham & Cox, 2007). Therefore, we hypothesise 
that 
H2: there is a negative relationship between block ownership and corporate FRDs. 
3.3 Board size and FRD 
Agency theorists suggest that larger boards are positively influencing performance, FRD 
and corporate disclosures by enhancing managerial monitoring (Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Elzahar 
& Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, the stakeholder theory argues that a larger 
board can ensure the security of critical business resources, such as finances and contracts and 
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minimise uncertainty due to the accessibility to the external environment of the firms, which is 
enhanced by a larger board (Jia et al., 2009, cited in Ntim et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
stakeholder theory argues that expertise through diversity is also brought by larger boards 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2013), as well as diversity in 
terms of representation from other stakeholder (Freeman, 1984, cited in Ntim et al., 2013) 
which improves reputation (Suchman, 1995; Raj & Handley-Schachler, 2009).  
However, other theorists suggest that smaller boards are the most appropriate because they 
enhance disclosure and performance and are at the same time more effective (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013). Larger boards come with more director free-riding, poor 
monitoring, communication and coordination, which affects performance and FRD negatively. 
Also, it can be argued that smaller boards enhance disclosure and performance because they 
enable frequent discussions that are more effective and candid. According to Ntim et al. (2013), 
board size is positively related to the extent of FRD. However, Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) 
suggest that there is no relationship between board size and FRD. This leads to the fourth 
hypothesis, which states that: 
H3: there is no significant relationship between board size and corporate FRDs. 
4. Research design 
4.1 Data and sample consideration 
This study examines UK companies’ annual reports in terms of the association between 
corporate governance characteristics, ownership structure and the extent of FRD. An FRD 
index is developed to measure the level of disclosure1.  
The sample was 50 non-financial UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange between 
2011 and 2015. The selection of the study sampled was ten different types of industry sectors, 
which are food producers, food and drug retailers, oil and gas producers, personal goods, 
leisure goods, tobacco, gas and water, electricity, mobile telecommunication and beverages. 
We began in 2011 to ensure that data influenced by or related to the global financial crisis of 
2007/2009 was excluded.  
4.2 Variables and measures 
Financial Risk Disclosure (FRD) – The study employs the content analysis in measuring the 
FRD, which is the dependent variable. The content analysis method will be suitable for 
                                                          
1For the individual items contained in the index, see the appendix. 
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measuring this dependent variable because it looks at the amount of extent as opposed to the 
level and quality of FRD (Adhikariparajul et al., 2019; Alnabsha et al., 2018; Alshbili et al., 
2019; Elamer, 2017; Elamer et al., 2018; Elamer & Benyazid, 2018; Elamer et al., 2019; Elamer 
et al., 2017; Elmagrhi et al., 2019). We employed the FRD index developed by Ntim et al. 
(2013) and Elamer et al. (2019). Table 1 shows the variables that will be used in the study. 
Table 1: List of Variables and their Measurements  
Variable Acronym Proxy(coding) 
Dependent variable 









This will be measured as risks that arise from 
major changes such as a shift in the interest 
rates; exchange rates; equity prices; commodity 
prices; liquidity; credit; financial 
instruments/derivatives; capital 
adequacy/insolvency; and executive 
compensation. 
Independent variable 
Block ownership  BOWN Percentage of ordinary shares that are held by the 
shareholders who have at least 3% of the total 
ordinary shareholdings of the company 
Board gender BG 
 
Percentage of female directors to the total number 
of directors on the firm’s board 
 
Board size  BSIZE Measured as the natural log of all the total 
number of company directors that are on the 
board of a given company 
Control variables 
A firm that has an 
established corporate 
governance committee 
CGCO Measured as either 1, that is where a company 
has established a corporate governance 
committee or 0, otherwise. 
A firm that has a corporate 
social responsibility 
committee 
CSRCO Measured as either 1, which is where a company 
has established a corporate social responsibility 
committee or 0, otherwise. 
 
A firm that is listed on a 
foreign stock market 
CLIST Measured as either 1, which is where a company 
is listed on a foreign stock market or 0, otherwise. 
 
4.4 Model Specification 
The study adopts a multiple regression to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and FRD as follows.  
FRD = β0 + β1*BOWN + β2*BG + β3*BSIZE + β4*CGCO + β5*CSRCO + β6*CLIST 




FRD is the corporate financial risk disclosure, BOWN is the block ownership, BG is the 
board gender, BSIZE is the board size, CGCO is a firm that has an established corporate 
governance committee, CSRCO is a firm that has an established corporate social responsibility 
committee, CLIST is a listed firm on a foreign stock market, β0 is regarded as a constant 
coefficient of this regression model, The parameters β1 to β7 are unknown parameters for the 
independent and control variable, ε  is the standard error of the regression model. Consequently, 



































5. Empirical analysis and discussion  
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the variables of this study; independent, 
dependent and control variables. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observation Minimum Maximum Mean Medium STD 
Dependent Variable 
 FRD (%) 250 30 100 65.20  70.00 16.03 
Independent Variables 
BOWN (%) 250 3.00 91.10 39.66  39.03 21.66 
Board Gender (%) 250 0.00 50.00 16.32  17.00 10.60 
 BSIZE 250 3.00 16.00 9.252 9.00 2.77 
Control Variables 
CGCO 250 0.00 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.43 
CSRCO 250 0.00 1.00 0.30  0.00 0.45 
CLIST 250 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.00 0.44 
 
The FRD variable has an average ratio of 65.2%. The FRD ranges from a minimum of 
30% to a maximum of 100%, with the median firms disclosing 65.20% and the medium is 70%, 
which is seven items divided by ten 7/10 sentences (disclosure index score) with a standard 
deviation of 16.03% of the FRD. The result is consistent with the findings of Elshandidy et al. 
(2015) and Ntim et al. (2013).  
Block Ownership (BOWN) – block ownership has an average of 39.66%, which ranges 
from a minimum of 3% to a maximum of 91.1% with a standard deviation of 21.665%. The 
block ownership statistic is much higher than the last 10 years in terms of mean value, which 
is 39.66%. This is in contrast to the fact that the UK is largely characterised by dispersed 
ownership (Ruiz-Mallorqui & Santana-Martin, 2011). This result is supported by the findings 
of Oliveira et al. (2011) and Abraham and Cox (2007).  
Board Gender Diversity Variable (BG) – the maximum percentage of females on the 
corporate board is only 50% with the average number being 16.3 %. This statistical outcome 
shows that the participation of women on corporate boards within the UK during the period 
covered by this study can be said to be still low. This finding appears to be close to the findings 
made by the previous studies (Ntim et al., 2012a; Barako & Brown, 2008; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Hence, the descriptive statistics have shown that the participation of women on the corporate 
board of directors has an average of 16.32%, which is the average of the participation of women 
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on the corporate board for the 10 different types of industry sector. It ranges from a minimum 
of 0% to a maximum of 50% with the median firms disclosing 16.30% of the total number of 
the board for the UK-based firms sentences with a standard deviation of 10.60%. This means 
that the participation of women on the corporate boards is still lower than the participation of 
men. 
The size of the corporate board in terms of the number of directors ranges from three to 16 
people with the usual number being nine and a standard deviation of 2.7733%. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code has not clearly specified the number of corporate board directors 
that a company should have in place but only states that a corporation should maintain a proper 
size of the board. The findings of this study appear to be supporting the research findings made 
by Allini et al. (2015), Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) and Jensen (1993) that an effective 
corporate board should have a number of directors that does not exceed seven or eight; 
otherwise, the proper functioning of the board might decline if the number is too large. 
However, varying opinions have emerged regarding the number of corporate board members 
such as the proposal made by Lipton & Lorsch (1992) and Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) who 
indicate that the ideal number of corporate board members should be between eight and nine. 
The average number of corporate board members in the case of this study is lower than the 
mean board size in the UK as mentioned by Vafeas & Theodorou (1998), which is 8.07. 
Table 3 indicates the correlation matrix, which is under the Pearson correlation assuming 
that the model for this study has been normally distributed. 
The correlation matrix can be used as a tool when it comes to checking for the 
multicollinearity problem within the regression model. Table 3 does not contain any coefficient 
that appears to exceed the 0.8 limit point, which is an indication that there is usually no existing 




Table 3: Correlation Matrix  




FRD 1       
BOWN 0.148* 1      
Board Gender 0.143* -0.364** 1     
BSIZE 0.000 -0.517** 0.275** 1    
CGCO -0.070 -0.169** 0.039 0.176** 1   
CSRCO -0.235** -0.255** 0.183** 0.167** 0.090 1  
CLIST 0.048 -.283** 0.168** 0.384** 0.370** -0.019 1 
Notes: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 3 shows that there is a significant positive relation between BOWN and FRD at a 
5% level, with a correlation coefficient of 0.148. This indicates that block ownership has an 
effect on FRD. Therefore, public interest and accountability in such firms are relatively 
unlimited. In addition, these firms will engage in a high level of FRD, including voluntary 
disclosures. This finding confirmed previous results from Oliveira et al. (2011) and Abraham 
& Cox (2007) that there is a positive association with FRD in particular and voluntary 
disclosure in general (Allini et al., 2015). However, the BSIZE, CGCO and CLIST have not 
correlated with FRD. These findings confirmed by Elzahar & Hussainey (2012).  
5.2 Multivariate regression Results 
The multiple regression model (Table 4) for all the predictors (BOWN, board gender, 
BSIZE, CGCO, CSRCO, and CLIST) produced R2 = 0.130, adjusted R2 = 0.109, F-value= 
6.052, significant at a 1% level (P ˂  0.000). The adjusted R square demonstrates the percentage 
which is the change in the dependent variable, which can be explained by the set of the 
independent and control variables in the model. This implies that the independent variables 
predict 10.9% of the FRD in the UK listed firms on the London Stock Exchange over the five 
years of investigation. 
This can imply that the influence of corporate governance on FRD is 10.9% only over the 
five years. This can confirm previous studies, for example, the result is rather consistent with 
the findings of Ntim et al. (2013) who suggested that “the corporate risk discloser is largely 
non-financial (i.e., mainly ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ risks)’ ‘historical’, ‘good news’ and 
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‘qualitative’ in nature over the ten-year period investigated”. But they have three different 
categories, however, this study has only one category of corporate risk discloser which is FRD, 
representing one-third of CRD categories in their study. According to the coefficient in Table 
4, the regression equations for the average of the five years from 2011 to 2015 are given as 
follows: 
FRD = 8.955 + 2.993BOWN + 3.750BG + 1.055BSIZE -0.761CGCO -3.707CSRCO + 
0.713CLIST + ε 






B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 51.847 5.790  8.955 0.000 
BOWN 0.164 0.055 0.222 2.993 0.003 
 Board Gender 0.371 0.099 0.245 3.750 0.000 
 BSIZE 0.448 .425 0.078 1.055 0.293 
 CGCO -1.807 2.375 -0.050 -0.761 0.447 
 CSRCO -8.171 2.204 -0.234 -3.707 0.000 
CLIST 1.780 2.496 0.050 0.713 0.476 
Further analytical results (diagnostic criteria) 
R Square 0.130 




Std. error of the estimate 15.1415 
 
5.3. Discussion 
From Table 4, the regression reveals a positive significant result at a 1% level for BOWN 
(+) and board gender (+), but a negative significant result at a 1% level for CSRCO (-). 
However, the regression has shown that there is no statistical relationship between those 
variables BSIZE (+), CGCO (-), CLIST (+) and the FRD. These results are consistent with four 
of the formulated hypotheses: H1 (BOWN), H3 (board gender), H4 (BSIZE) and H5 (CSRCO). 
Those hypotheses were accepted, but H2 (DBLS) was rejected due to the constancy of this 
variable. 
5.3.1 Block Ownership Variable (BOWN) 
Block ownership of the non-financial UK listed firms is significantly positively related to 
FRD at a 99% level of confidence in the regression and is consistent with the prior correlation 
analysis. Nevertheless the P value of the block ownership is 0.003: this value is significant at 
a 0.01 level which is highly related to the FRD and its attributes. The P value was less than 5% 
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which means that there is a significant positive relationship between block ownership and FRD. 
Furthermore, this result is substantially consistent with the prior correlation analysis, where the 
correlation coefficient value was 0.148. That can imply that the power which is owned by the 
block ownership in the UK firms that is 3% or more than 3% (which is required by the firms’ 
rules) in the status positions of the right to vote or decision makers, can lead to a better level 
of FRD. This is due to their interest and also to maximise the volume for the shareholder as 
well as the stakeholder. Furthermore, it minimises the agency problem as well as the financial 
risk in the business. This result converses the multi-theoretical framework, which incorporates 
insights from agency, stakeholder, shareholder. This indicates that block ownership has an 
effect on FRD. Furthermore, public interest and accountability in such firms are relatively 
unlimited. Therefore, this can imply that the UK firms will engage in a high level of FRD, 
including voluntary disclosures. This result supports the findings of Oliveira et al. (2011) and 
Abraham & Cox (2007). There is a positive association with FRD in particular and voluntary 
disclosure in general (Allini et al., 2015). In this study the regression result has shown that 
block ownership is positively related to the level of FRD. However, the result is inconsistent 
with the findings of Allini et al. (2015) and Ntim et al. (2013). Block ownership is negatively 
associated with the level of FRD which is one category of CRD. Therefore, the contrasting 
results between Ntim et al. (2013) and this paper may result from the different corporate 
governance codes and backgrounds of South Africa and the UK. 
5.3.2 Board Gender 
Board gender of the non-financial UK listed firms is significantly positively related to FRD 
at a 99% level of confidence in the regressions and is consistent with the prior correlation 
analysis. Moreover, the P value of the board gender is 0.000 and this value is significant at a 
0.01 level which is highly related to FRD and its attributes. The P value was less than 5% which 
means that there is a significant positive relationship between board gender and FRD. 
Furthermore, this result is substantially consistent with the prior correlation analysis, where the 
correlation coefficient value was 0.166. This can indicate that female members disclose more 
information than male members on the board of directors in the UK firms. This result supports 
the findings of Ntim et al. (2012a), Barako & Brown (2008) and Ntim et al. (2013), who argued 
that “corporate boards of diverse ethnic and gender backgrounds tend to make more voluntary 
disclosures” (Ntim et al., 2013, p.377). Furthermore, the evidence added to the results of the 
previous studies (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Carter et al., 2003) indicate that board gender and 
ethnicity has a positive impact on company outcomes. 
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This result converses the multi-theoretical framework which incorporates insights from 
agency, shareholder, stakeholder. This can lead relatively to the formation of board diversity. 
This might cause more pressure (especially by the female members and black ownership) to 
engage in greater FRD which is one category of  CRD (ibid.). Even the percentage of females 
on the corporate board is still low with a maximum of 50% only and an average number of 
16.3%, confirmed by Table 3 (Descriptive Statistics). The result is strongly consistent with the 
findings of Ntim et al. (2013), who found that board diversity is positively related to the extent 
of FRD in nature over the five-year period investigated. Furthermore, Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) supported this point of view by indicating that the difference in gender can offer new 
experiences and knowledge. However, this may lead to board conflict problems. Thus, board 
gender can lead to an improvement in board effectiveness, and have a good impact on firms’ 
FRD as well. 
In addition, female directors have simply received attention in the economic downturn 
period. For instance, the CG code in China does not require board gender diversity (Deloitte, 
2015), but the UK Corporate Governance Regulation requires the presence of females on the 
board, ordered by the Higgs report in 2003 to improve the efficacy of board directors. 
5.3.3 Board Size (BSIZE) 
According to the coefficient in Table 4 the board size of the non-financial UK listed firms 
has not influenced FRD, with a P value of 0.293 in nature over the five-year investigating 
period. This is more than 5% which means that there is no relationship between board size and 
FRD. The regression result has shown that there is no relationship between the board size and 
FRD. This result also supports the findings of Elzahar & Hussainey (2012) who suggest that 
there is no relationship between board size and FRD. Furthermore, this result is substantially 
consistent with the prior correlation analysis, where the correlation coefficient value was -0.47 
which is an insignificant relationship. Otherwise, the result is inconsistent with the findings of 
Ntim et al. (2013), who found that board size is positively related to the extent of FRD. It is 
possible to positively influence performance, FRD and corporate disclosures with larger boards 
and enhanced managerial monitoring as suggested by the agency theory (ibid.). Similarly, the 
stakeholder theory states that larger boards ensure the security of critical business resources 
such as contracts and finance and minimise uncertainty because accessibility to a company’s 
external environment is enhanced by a larger board (Jia et al., 2009, cited in Ntim et al., 2013). 
This finding is supported by the multi-theoretical framework which incorporates insights 
from agency, stakeholder, shareholder. This finding can imply that board size has no influence 
on the requirements of FRD in the UK listed firms on the London Stock Exchange over the 
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five-year period of investigation. The finding can be explained by the nature of the financial 
risk over this period. Therefore, the contrasting result between Ntim et al. (2013) and this paper 
may result from the different corporate governance codes and background of South Africa and 
the UK. 
5.3.4 Corporate Social Responsibility Committee (CSRCO) 
According to Table 4, there is a very significant negative relationship between CSRCO 
and FRD at a 1% level, with a P-value of -0.000 in nature over the five-year investigation 
period, which is less than 5%. This means that there is no relationship between board size and 
FRD. This can indicate that firms that have established a corporate social responsibility 
committee will disclose less than firms without an established CSRCO. It has a negative impact 
on FRD, in terms of encouraging CSR in the UK. Moreover, this result is substantially 
consistent with the prior correlation analysis, where the correlation coefficient value was -
0.232. The CSRCO of the non-financial UK listed firms negatively influences FRD. This result 
is in line with the findings obtained by Ntim et al. (2013), Khan et al. (2013) and Reverte (2009) 
who observed that closely-held companies can disclose substantially less information in terms 
of CSR practices (ibid.). According to Ntim et al. (2013), CSR and voluntary disclosure can 
reduce the incidences of corruption and fraud. Furthermore, they have linked CSR with the 
diversity of the board and board size. The CSR reporting will be high if the board is more 
diverse and if the larger boards disclose more information in terms of CSR practices and 
voluntary disclosure. 
5.3.5 CGCO and CLIST 
The CGCO and CLIST have no significant connection with the level of FRD. They were 
control variables, with a P-value of -0.761 and 0.713, respectively. This is substantially more 
than 5%, which means that there is no relationship between those two variables and FRD. 
Nevertheless, taking into consideration the prior correlation analysis the results were 
substantially consistent, with the correlation coefficient values at -0.067 and 0.063 respectively. 
This can imply that there is no relationship between the corporate governance committee and 
cross-listing on influencing the level of FRD. This finding is supported by Elzahar & Hussainey 
(2012) who observed that cross-listing UK firms have no influence on FRD. Taylor et al. (2010) 
argued that cross-listing is negatively connected with FRD patterns. This result is inconsistent 
with prior research that found a positive association between overseas stock exchange listing 
firms and FRD (Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009; Mangena & Pike, 2005). Cross-listing can 
give firms an opportunity to access many alternate finance sources. Even if there is an 
additional risk disclosure required by different regulatory frameworks, the board of directors 
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has an incentive to provide more financial risk information in its financial reports. Thus, the 
securities will be more attractive, helping directors to send good signals about risk management 
activities, operations’ sustainability and different risks including FRD. Previous risk disclosure 
studies have shown a positive relationship between cross-listing firms and the levels of risk 
disclosure (ibid.). 
According to IAS 34, the requirement of disclosure in UK annual reports is greater than 
the interim report disclosure. Thus, UK listed firms are required to disclose more information 
in the annual reports than the interim reports, which can lead to voluntarily disclosure. 
Furthermore, the half-yearly reporting in the UK is one of the requirements of the London 
Stock Exchange (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). 
With respect to the determinants of FRD, this study finds that BOWN and board gender 
are significantly positively related to the level of FRD, whereas CSRCO is significantly 
negatively associated with the level of FRD. By contrast, board size has no significant 
connection with the level of FRD. 
Table 5: Summary of Hypotheses Tested 
No Hypotheses Results 
H1 There is a significant positive relationship between a block ownership structure of 
corporate organisation and the efficiency of FRD. 
Accepted 
 
H2 There is a significant positive relationship between the female gender of a corporate 
board and the efficiency of FRD. 
Accepted 
H3 There is no significant relationship between the board size and the FRD. Accepted 
H4 There is a significant negative relationship between the corporate social 
responsibility committee and the level of FRD. 
Accepted 
6. Summary and conclusion 
The focus of this study was to investigate the relevant impacts of corporate governance in 
terms of financial risk reporting in the UK. In particular, the study sought to investigate and 
analyse how corporate governance mechanisms influence the system of financial risk reporting 
among UK firms. The following are the sub-objectives that guided the undertaking of this 
study: (i) to investigate and analyse the level of FRD by UK firms and (ii) to investigate and 
analyse the determinants of risk disclosure by UK firms. The study used a quantitative research 
design and applied a descriptive research design. The target population for the study included 
21 
 
all UK firms that are listed on the London Stock Exchange and were operational between 2011 
and 2015. The sample population was 50 UK non-financial listed firms operating in 10 different 
types of industry sectors, which are food producers, food and drug retailers, oil and gas 
producers, personal goods, leisure goods, tobacco, gas and water, electricity, mobile 
telecommunication and beverages. The timespan was from 2011 to 2015 for those companies 
who witnessed a change in FRD during this period of time. Multiple regression analysis was 
used to test the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and FRD by UK firms. 
The findings of this study point to the conclusion that corporate governance has a 
significant influence on FRD especially in the case of the levels of risk disclosure in the annual 
reports. With respect to the determinants of FRD, this study finds that there are positive 
correlations between block ownership, board gender and FRD, which are significantly related 
to the level of FRD. In this study, the regression result has shown that block ownership is 
positively related to the level of FRD. Block ownership is negatively associated with the level 
of FRD, which is one category of CRD. A positive relationship is observed between board 
gender and FRD, with this result supporting the findings of Ntim et al. (2012a), Barako & 
Brown (2008) and Ntim et al. (2013), who argued that “corporate boards of diverse ethnic and 
gender backgrounds tend to make more voluntary disclosures” (Ntim et al., 2013, p.377). 
Furthermore, the evidence added to the results of previous studies (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Carter 
et al., 2003) that indicate that board gender and ethnicity have a positive impact on company 
outcomes. 
The CSR committee is negatively associated with the level of FRD. The negative result 
has been confirmed by Ntim et al. (2013), Khan et al. (2013) and Reverte (2009) who observed 
that closely-held companies disclose substantially less information on their CSR practices, 
which will lead to a negative influence on FRD. In addition, this contrasts with the requirements 
of IAS 34. By contrast, the board size, CGCO, CLIST and DBLS have no significant 
connection with the level of FRD. The regression result has shown that there is no relationship 
between the board size, CLIST and FRD. This result supports the findings of Elzahar & 
Hussainey (2012) who suggest that there is no relationship between board size, CLIST and 
FRD. Furthermore, this result is substantially consistent with the previous correlation analysis. 
However, according to Taylor et al. (2010) cross-listing is negatively connected with FRD 
patterns. 
This finding has provided empirical support for the predictions of a multi-theoretical 
framework. It is also consistent with the findings of Ntim et al. (2013), Elzahar & Hussainey 
(2012), Khan et al. (2013), Barako and Brown (2008) and Allini et al. (2015). Nevertheless, 
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with consideration of the previous correlation analysis, the results were substantially 
consistent. The testing of the hypotheses (H1 to H4) provided results that accepted the 
hypotheses as correct as summarised below in accordance to the variables used in the study. 
The findings of this study are expected to contribute to the literature on corporate 
governance and FRD and in particular in the context of publicly listed firms in the UK. Due to 
the nature of the London Stock Exchange, which makes it more complex to undertake a broad-
based study, the findings of this study provide correct evidence on how corporate governance 
mechanisms affect FRD among UK publicly listed firms. This is because the study used a 
multi-theoretical framework, where the study looks into essential and relevant theories such as 
agency and stakeholder. The findings of this study will enhance understanding with regard to 
the level of FRD and the determinants of risk disclosure, such as the corporate ownership 
structure and the characteristics of a corporate board. In addition, the findings of this study are 
expected to add to the literature regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
features and practices of FRD in developed countries such as the UK. This study has significant 
implications for policy-makers, investors and regulators. Evidence of growing FRD implies that 
efforts by several stakeholders have had some positive impact on the level of FRD in the firms 
examined. Though, given the varied variances in the level and focus of FRD indicates that 
some attention to the quality of information released by firms is essential if they are to be 
valuable to stakeholders, such as investors. Second, the results show the importance of current 
CG reforms in the UK and their impact on enhancing FRD. Examples of such changes include 
increasing board size and gender diversity acting as effective firm-level advisors and monitors 
of FRD. As a consequence, regulators and policymakers should continually pursue reforms to 
encourage firms to follow CG principles that are promoted as good practice.  
The London Stock Exchange is ranked among the largest and most advanced stock 
exchanges in the world. As a result, it has a huge and growing number of listed firms. This was 
one of the main limitations experienced during the undertaking of this study; hence, the focus 
was only on a small sample population of 50 non-financial firms. This was a drop in the ocean 
compared to the 2,324 firms that are listed on the London Stock Exchange. Another major 
limitation was that the firms listed are mixed in terms of their nature and size of operations, 
thereby presenting a challenge when it came to the generalisation of the findings of this study. 
The nature of this study introduces time limitations as the researcher was expected to spend 15 
days collecting the secondary data. However, it took 35 days due to the complexity in the 
annual reports of the firms. Although some of the data were available online, there were certain 
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cases of data that needed to be manually accessed, making it expensive and cumbersome for 
the researcher. 
Given the limitations discussed above, this study suggests some recommendations to 
encourage the undertaking of further research relating to corporate governance and FRD. This 
study mainly focused on the impact of corporate governance when it comes to FRD in firms’ 
annual reports that are listed on the London Stock Exchange. Since the focus of this study was 
confined within the UK corporate context, further research studies can seek to expand the focus 
or context by looking at developing as well as emerging economies such as China, India, South 
Africa and Brazil. The period of observation for this study (2011 – 2015) appears to be quite 
short if the changes of corporate governance can be properly analysed in a fast-changing world. 
As a result, there is a need for a study that looks at the impact of corporate governance on FRD 
in the pre-global financial crisis period, during the crisis as well as after the crisis in order to 
examine if there is a pattern with regard to the changes experienced in the global economy. 
There is a need to focus on other variables different from the ones covered in this study, which 
aim to examine more deeply the impact of other variables, such as corporate board 
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